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The budgeting reform literature is replete with examples of reforms such as performance budgeting,
program budgeting, and zero-base budgeting that have failed to achieve their stated goals. This arti-
cle analyzes a new budgetary reform that has been introduced in the state of Georgia, which appears
to be accomplishing what its proponents have pronounced. This reform is known as redirection. The
article defines redirection, explains how it works, and shows that redirection has enabled budget
actors to reset budgetary priorities and reduce agency acquisitiveness, at least in its first 2 years in
operation.
This article analyzes the effects of a budgetary reform that has been introduced
recently in the state of Georgia by Governor Zell Miller. The reform is known as
redirection. Redirection is designed to serve two purposes: (a) to enable budget
actors to reset budgetary priorities, particularly in areas of interest to the gover-
nor, and (b) to counter the agency strategy of acquisitiveness, which is the strat-
egy of agencies to expand their budgets by requesting large increases. This
research project is the first to attempt to study the unexplored area of redirection.
It will reveal what redirection is, how it works, how it compares to previous
reform efforts, and what effects redirection has had on budgeting in Georgia
after 2 years in practice.
Since V. O. Key (1940) first posed the question, “On what basis shall it be
decided to allocate x dollars to activity A instead of activity B?” (p. 1138) schol-
ars and reformers have been struggling to develop a budgetary system in which
allocation decisions are based not on previous allocation patterns but on a clear
and systematic analysis of how resources can best be spent to meet government’s
highest priorities. Performance budgeting, program budgeting, and zero-based
budgeting are the best known attempts to reassess the budget base each budget
cycle, in an effort to reallocate resources from low-priority programs to more
effective or higher priority programs rather than simply provide incremental
increases to all projects. Although these reforms have left their mark on budget-
ary practices, they have not produced many reallocations within the budget base.
Redirection is the latest effort to achieve this goal.
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DATA SOURCES
The data used for this article came from the Governor’s Budget Report, fiscal
years (FYs) 1992 to 1998, and the FY 1998 Appropriations Act. FYs 1992 to
1998 were examined because they were the years in which Governor Miller pre-
sented budgets to the legislature. The Department of Children and Youth Ser-
vices and the Department of Human Resources are not included in the FY 1992
data, because at that time, the Department of Children and Youth Services was a
part of the Department of Human Resources and their budgeting data was com-
bined. It was not possible to separate them given the data available.
Information presented here was also derived from interviews with the direc-
tor of the Office of Planning and Budget (OPB), budget analysts from OPB, the
director of the Legislative Budget Office1 (LBO), and the fiscal officers of the
executive agencies. The interview format consisted of open-ended questions
designed to produce nonstructured responses. Confidentiality was pledged to
each of the interviewees. Budget officials from 29 of Georgia’s 30 agencies
(96.7%) agreed to be interviewed. Of the 19 OPB analysts charged with advising
and reviewing the budgets for these agencies, 100% agreed to be interviewed.
Interviews lasted between 25 and 90 minutes.
REDIRECTION IN GEORGIA
Why Redirection Now?
During the 1980s, Georgia experienced what Allen Schick (1980) would
classify as relaxed scarcity, “a situation in which governments have sufficient
resources to continue existing programs and to undertake substantial new
budget commitments” (p. 116). During this time period, Georgia revenues
increased each year, from a low of 7.2 to a high of 12.7%. This high rate of reve-
nue growth enabled the state to both expand existing programs and introduce
new services without raising taxes (Lauth, 1994). Although revenue collections
were not enough to satisfy all of the demands placed on the budget, revenue
growth provided enough resources to meet adequately the initiatives of the gov-
ernor and the legislature. There was little incentive to scrutinize existing pro-
grams entrenched in the budget base. Doing so was undesirable to policy makers
because it would likely raise the level of political conflict connected with budget
making. The recession of the early 1990s ended the period of relaxed scarcity in
Georgia. As Georgia came out of the recession, economic forecasts predicted
that revenue growth would fall to much lower levels than had been experienced
during the 1980s. According to these economic forecasts, revenues were
expected to increase by no more than 5.5% to 6.5% each year for the duration of
the 1990s. Georgia began to encounter what Schick (1980) refers to as chronic
scarcity. Under conditions of chronic scarcity, revenue collections provide
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enough funds for the continuation of existing programs but very little for growth
and expansion.
Governor Miller realized that the expected growth in revenues would not be
enough to fund his highest priorities; an increase in funding for education and a
reduction of the sales tax on food items. If he wanted to advance these priorities,
he would have to find the necessary resources elsewhere. Because he and the leg-
islature were committed to not raising taxes; the money needed to fund the gov-
ernor’s priorities would have to be found in the budget base.
To extract resources from the budget base, the governor wanted to develop an
effective way to get agencies to examine their budgets to find activities that are
no longer a priority or useful and to downsize or eliminate them. The governor
believed that many of the programs accumulated by agencies over the years
either have run their course and accomplished their objectives, been ineffective,
or are not vital to the core mission of the implementing agency. Governor Mil-
ler’s goal is to redirect the money saved from the elimination of these obsolete
programs to higher priority activities.
To adequately fund his priorities, the governor realized that he needed to do
more than reallocate money from the budget base of agencies. He also had to
diminish competing claims on the new money that was generated by revenue
growth. Therefore, he needed to reduce the ability of agencies to act in an
acquisitive manner.
Numerous studies have explored the impact of agency requests on budget
growth (LeLoup & Moreland, 1978; Sharkansky, 1968; Thompson, 1987).
These studies found that agency acquisitiveness tends to result in larger budget
increases for agencies.
Agencies in Georgia use the acquisitive strategy frequently, often requesting
increases in excess of 50% of their previous year’s budget authority (Lauth,
1987). This strategy not only enables agencies to increase their budgets but also
helps them deflect political conflict away from themselves and onto the gover-
nor and legislature. They request all they can justify, blame the governor and leg-
islature if their requests are cut, and maintain political allies by continuing to
fund established programs in their base.
If the governor allowed agencies to continue to make requests for all they
could justify, the supporters of these competing claims would make it politically
difficult for him to meet his priorities. It was necessary for the governor to estab-
lish a system that not only would reallocate money from within the budget base
but also would curtail agency driven expenditures by limiting agency acquisi-
tiveness. Redirection was designed to do both of these things.
Redirection Defined
Redirection consists of two elements. The first element attempts to reallocate
funds in the budget base by requiring agencies to identify a minimum of 5% of
their previous year’s state appropriated adjusted base,2 which they believe is of
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low priority, ineffective, or obsolete. This 5% is referred to as redirected funds.
Agencies then are given the opportunity to demonstrate how they could spend
their 5% to better meet what they perceive to be their highest priorities. The
funds that are identified must be available to other agencies.3
The governor uses the information generated by each agency to determine
how the redirected funds are to be spent. The governor has three options avail-
able to him. First, he can choose to follow agency requests and redirect the
money to higher priorities within each agency. Funds retained by agencies in
this manner are referred to as additions or “add-backs.” Second, he may decide
to redirect the funds to higher priorities in other areas of government. This, of
course, would result in a cut for each agency losing its redirection money. Third,
he may choose not to redirect the money, insisting instead that it be spent on the
activities it was appropriated for the previous FY. The governor’s redirection
recommendations are subject to change by the legislature. Agencies are not per-
mitted to submit requests during the supplemental appropriation that would
restore funds lost due to redirection.
This element of redirection allows the governor, legislature, and agencies
each to have a voice in the decisions that are made. Agencies, which are respon-
sible for certain missions assigned to them by elected officials, are given the
opportunity to identify activities that are not essential to their core missions and
explain how they can better spend the money. The governor then reviews the
agency requests and either accepts or rejects them, based on his priorities. He
submits his recommendations to the legislature, which reviews them and makes
adjustments based on its priorities. At each level, tradeoffs are made between
priorities. In addition, all of the changes are designed to be made at the margins;
therefore, no dramatic changes will be proposed that threaten to raise the level of
political conflict. Most government activities continue to be funded at their
same levels, while money is found by the governor, legislature, and agencies to
fund additional activities that are important to them.
The second aspect of redirection attempts to restrain agency-driven expendi-
tures, by preventing agencies from requesting increases that amount to more
than the projected revenue increase for the upcoming FY (6.5% for FY 1997;
4.5% for FY 1998). The increase is not adjusted for inflation. This cap on budget
increases does not apply to requests for capital outlay projects. Requests for
increases above the adjusted base are referred to as enhancements.
This element of the redirection reform is designed to force agencies to be
more selective in the kinds of increases they ask for. It is hoped that agencies will
now limit their requested increases to items that best enable them to achieve
their most important objectives, rather than requesting anything that they can
conceivably justify.
It should be noted that the governor in Georgia has several strong budgetary
powers. First, the governor has the line-item veto power over appropriations.
Governor Miller has threatened to use it against any agencies that do not comply
in good faith with redirection. The legislature’s ability to override such a veto is
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virtually nil, because the governor signs the budget bill into law after the legisla-
tive session has concluded. Second, the governor appoints the majority of the
executive branch agency heads. Governor Miller has threatened to terminate any
agency head who does not comply in good faith with redirection. Finally, the
governor sets the revenue projections. Therefore, the legislature is limited in its
ability to circumvent the governor’s redirection requests because restoring cuts
made by the governor would require the legislature to make cuts in other areas of
the budget, often a politically difficult thing to do. These powers of the governor
should help redirection to succeed in accomplishing its goals.
Differences With Previous Reform Efforts
As stated earlier, performance budgeting, program budgeting, and zero-
based budgeting failed to meet the expectations of their supporters. Redirection
differs from these reform efforts in four important ways that may help it to
achieve greater success. First, the information generated by previous reforms,
particularly performance budgeting and program budgeting, often was ignored
by important budgetary actors because they were not compelled to use it when
making funding decisions (Grafton & Permaloff, 1983; Schick, 1971, 1972;
Sudama, 1977). Instead of being incorporated into the decision-making process,
the information produced by these reforms was simply provided alongside tradi-
tional budgeting information. Legislators usually preferred the traditional form
of budgeting data to the information produced by the reforms. Because they
were presented with both types of information and were under no legal or proce-
dural obligation to use the reform data, they often chose to disregard the infor-
mation generated by the reforms.
Contrary to performance budgeting and program budgeting, redirection was
incorporated into the budget process in Georgia. Georgia’s governor has the
power to order agencies to follow his instructions when preparing their budget
requests. Governor Miller used this power to force agencies to comply with the
redirection requirements. The governor warned agencies that he would fire any
appointed agency head who did not comply with redirection in good faith. He
also threatened to have OPB submit redirection requests on behalf of any agen-
cies that attempted to get around the reform. In addition, the legislature incorpo-
rated the governor’s redirection requests into their tracking document, ensuring
that they would consider and respond to each recommended redirection.
Second, important budgeting actors often did not support previous reforms
because those reforms did not serve their political interests. Zero-base budget-
ing required agencies to submit minimum levels of funding for each of their pro-
grams, so that elected officials could decide how far programs could be cut back
in order to shift money to higher priorities. However, cutting programs to their
minimum level was politically difficult to do. Maintaining programs at at least
their current levels often served the political interests of important budget mak-
ers (Lauth, 1978; Schick, 1978). As a result, these actors ignored the minimum
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levels, which caused many agency officials to put forth little effort in formulat-
ing realistic minimum levels of funding (Lauth, 1978; Moore, 1980), a key ele-
ment of zero-based budgeting. In addition, agencies operating under zero-base
budgeting rules were expected to rank all of their activities in order of impor-
tance. After all of the decision packages had been ranked, budget makers deter-
mined how much funding each agency would receive. Activities ranked as being
the most important were funded first. Activities ranked lower were funded only
if the resources budgeted to the agency were sufficient to finance them. This sys-
tem gave agencies discretion over allocation decisions at the expense of elected
officials. Not wanting to give up this discretion, elected officials often ignored
the agency rankings.
Performance budgeting also overlooked many of the important political
realities that exist in government budgeting. It assumed that it is politically easy
to come to agreement on program goals and that all budget actors seek to find the
most efficient method of achieving those goals (Bibb, 1984; Howard, 1973;
Mosher, 1969; Schick, 1966; Wildavsky, 1992). This, however, is not how pub-
lic budgeting generally works. Legislators, for example, may be more interested
in ensuring that money for a specific project be spent in their district than they
are about how efficiently the money is spent. Because important political values
and the impacts of those values on budget allocation decisions were overlooked
by performance budgeting, much of the information produced by it was ignored
(Alesch, 1968; Silverman, 1974).
Redirection does not confront many of the political difficulties discussed
above because it avoids restrictive requirements that might work against the
interests of important actors. Rather than compel agencies to calculate a mini-
mum funding level for each of their activities, agencies are permitted to focus
only on identifying those activities that they consider to be their lowest priori-
ties. Instead of restricting the discretion of elected officials by forcing them to
follow agency rankings that are based on agency priorities, elected officials are
able to put forward their priorities by reviewing agency recommendations and
altering them as they deem pertinent. Finally, rather than base allocation deci-
sions on a narrow criteria such as efficiency, agencies are permitted to evaluate
their programs based on whatever criteria is most appropriate. As a result,
important political actors supported the redirection reform.
Actors whose support, whether gained through coercion or co-optation, is
believed to be crucial to the success of budget reforms include chief executives
(Howard, 1973; Lauth, 1992; Ramsey & Hackbart, 1979), legislators (Howard,
1973; Lauth, 1978, 1992; Silverman, 1974), agency heads (Harper, Kramer, &
Rouse, 1969; Howard, 1973; Lauth, 1985), and budget office officials (Ramsey &
Hackbart, 1979; Schick, 1971). The interviews with budget officers in Georgia
revealed that these actors tended to support redirection. The director of OPB
stated that both his office and the governor were strong supporters of the reform.
This is not surprising, given that redirection was initiated by the governor and
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OPB. In addition, 25 of the 29 (86.2%) agency fiscal officers interviewed
claimed that their agency heads were supportive of redirection. Once again, this
is not surprising, given that most of the agency heads were appointed by the gov-
ernor and threatened with termination if they did not support the reform. Finally,
the director of LBO claimed that redirection does serve the political interests of
the legislature because it enables the legislature to shift resources to areas that
are high priorities to its members.
Third, the budget actors responsible for implementing previous reforms
often did not understand them and lacked the training necessary to carry them
out. If those responsible for executing the reform are not equipped to administer
it, then the reform is unlikely to have its desired impact on budgeting practices.
One serious problem experienced by program budgeting was that many of the
officials assigned the task of implementing the reform were trained in more tra-
ditional budgeting methods and were unfamiliar with the analytical techniques
so important to program budgeting (Alesch, 1968; Axelrod, 1988; Botner, 1970;
Grafton & Permaloff, 1983). This, however, has not proven to be a problem for
redirection. When questioned in this regard, none of the Georgia officials inter-
viewed mentioned that they or anyone else charged with carrying out redirection
were inadequately trained. This is likely the result of redirection not requiring
any type of in-depth analysis of programs. The redirection philosophy assumes
that agencies are in the best position to determine which of their programs are
working effectively and which are no longer useful. Agencies are given the dis-
cretion to decide what types of analytical techniques, if any, they will use when
evaluating their programs and activities. How they present their justifications
for their requests is left up to them.
Fourth, previous reforms were overly comprehensive in their scope. They
generally required that everything within the budget be examined or analyzed in
some way during each budget cycle. Performance budgeting dictated that output
measures be established for all government activities. Program budgeting
required that alternatives for each program be evaluated and compared using
policy analysis. Zero-base budgeting demanded that all government activities
be divided into decision units and ranked according to their importance in
achieving government objectives. The comprehensiveness of these reforms
made them impractical, in that they buried officials under mountains of paper-
work that was beyond the cognitive abilities of policy makers to absorb. Further-
more, much of the data produced by the reforms were ignored by policy makers
because they dealt with programs that were politically untouchable and thus
unlikely to be changed. As a result, a great deal of time was spent producing data
that were never used.
Redirection does not suffer from this problem of being overly comprehen-
sive. Redirection is a reform that focuses only on the margins. Most of the
budget base is not considered because it is understood that the majority of the
budget is difficult to change politically. It is believed, however, that there are
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things at the 5% margin that can and should be changed. Redirection concen-
trates on these things.
Because it focuses only on the margins, redirection does not require that an
in-depth analysis of all government activities be performed. As stated above,
agencies are granted the flexibility to analyze what they want in any manner that
they choose. This is permitted because it is assumed that agencies know best
what to evaluate and how to evaluate it. As a result, agencies do not waste a lot of
valuable time conducting analysis that they know will not be put to use.
REDIRECTION’S IMPACT
Effects on the Base, FY 1997
Redirection has been successful at reallocating funds both within and
between agencies. Table 1 lists the agency redirections and additions accepted
by the governor for submission into his FY 1997 budget recommendation to the
general assembly. Total funds accepted for redirection, redirected funds remain-
ing within their agency of origin (additions), and redirected funds shifted out of
their agency of origin and reallocated to other agencies are provided as a per-
centage of the previous year’s (FY 1996) budget authority. The FY 1996 budget
authority is examined instead of the adjusted base because this is generally how
cuts and increases are measured in the budgeting literature; and the agencies,
governor, and legislature generally have different ideas about what the adjusted
base is.
Table 1 reveals that $627.4 million out of a budget of $11.3 billion was
accepted by the governor for redirection for FY 1997. This equals 5.9% of the
FY 1996 budget authority. Table 1 also shows that agencies had an average of
5.7% of their FY 1996 budget authority accepted for redirection.4 Of the money
that was accepted by the governor for redirection, about $400.7 million was
redirected within agencies, an average of 3.41% of each agency’s FY 1996
budget authority. These funds represent resources that agencies were able to
shift within their bases from low to higher priorities. Money shifted in this man-
ner is not considered a cut because it remains in the coffers of the agency from
which it originated. This money constituted 64% of the redirection total and
amounted to 3.8% of the FY 1996 budget authority.
The remainder of the money accepted by the governor for redirection, $226.7
million, was redirected out of agencies. These funds made up 36% of the redirec-
tion total and amounted to 2.1% of the FY 1996 budget authority. This repre-
sents an average cut of 2.29% to the state’s agencies. This is money that was redi-
rected out of agencies to higher priorities in other agencies. Readers will note
that negative numbers exist in Table 1, column 3, for a few agencies. These num-
bers signify cases in which the governor was persuaded to provide certain agen-
cies with funds in excess of what he redirected away from them. As a result,
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these numbers reflect increases in agency budgets above their adjusted base due
to redirection.
Effects on the Base, FY 1998
Table 2 tells a slightly different story. Table 2 reveals that $349 million out of
a budget of $11.8 billion was accepted by the governor for redirection for FY
1997, a decline of $278.4 million (55.6%) from the previous FY. This total
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TABLE 1: Governor’s Fiscal Year 1997 Redirection Recommendations as a Percentage of Fiscal
Year 1996 Budget Authority
Total Funds Redirected Redirected
Agency to Redirect Within Agency Out of Agency
Administrative Services 2.61 2.97 –0.35
Agriculture 4.07 2.10 1.97
Banking and Finance 6.31 6.06 0.26
Children and Youth Services 4.79 4.57 0.22
Community Affairs 4.06 0.65 3.41
Corrections 6.73 2.04 4.68
Defense 5.06 0.00 5.06
Education 6.92 5.17 1.75
Forestry Commission 5.04 0.68 4.35
Georgia Bureau of Investigation 4.51 1.59 2.92
Office of the Governor 6.05 0.00 6.05
Human Resources 6.03 2.56 3.47
Industry, Trade, and Tourism 4.71 0.83 3.88
Insurance Commissioner 5.08 0.53 4.54
Labor 0.14 0.00 0.14
Law 2.26 2.26 0.00
Medical Assistance 8.49 4.64 3.85
Natural Resources 4.96 2.33 2.63
Public Safety 1.64 1.26 0.37
Public Service Commission 4.74 2.73 2.01
Student Finance Commission 1.02 1.02 0.00
Regents 3.42 2.43 0.99
Revenue 4.42 2.20 2.21
Secretary of State 3.72 1.52 2.19
Soil and Water Conservation Commission 6.60 4.40 2.20
Teachers’ Retirement System 1.10 2.45 –1.35
Technical and Adult Education 4.24 4.24 0.00
Transportation 5.27 5.28 –0.01
Veterans Service 40.90 30.92 9.98
Workers Compensation Board 6.20 4.80 1.40
Average 5.70 3.41 2.29
Total (in million dollars) 627.4 400.7 226.7
Total dollars as percentage of fiscal year
1996 budget authority 5.9 3.8 2.1
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equals 3.1% of the FY 1997 budget authority. Agencies had an average of 4.0%
of their FY 1997 budget authority accepted for redirection. Of the funds that
were accepted by the governor for redirection for FY 1998, approximately
$296.7 million was redirected within agencies, an average of 3.04% of each
agency’s FY 1997 budget authority. This money constituted 85% of the redirec-
tion total, a significant increase over the portion of redirection funds kept within
its agency of origin in FY 1997. These funds amounted to 2.6% of the FY 1997
budget authority.
The resources accepted by the governor to be redirected out of agencies for
FY 1998 totaled $52.3 million. These funds made up only 15% of the redirection
total and amounted to 0.5% of the FY 1997 budget authority. This represents an
average cut of 0.96% to the state’s agencies.
The differences between the FY 1997 and FY 1998 redirection totals reveal
that the aggregate amount of redirected funds declined during redirection’s sec-
ond year. One major reason for this was that Medicaid payments for FY 1997
were much lower than projected. As a result, the state had more funds available
to it for FY 1998 than had previously been anticipated. Therefore, the governor
did not need to redirect as many agency resources in FY 1998 to adequately fund
his highest priorities. This decline in the amount of agency funds redirected in
FY 1998 could also indicate that many agencies have redirected most of their
low-priority items out of their budgets, leaving them with no choice but to offer
up higher priority items that the governor is reluctant to cut. The governor’s
unwillingness to redirect as many funds in FY 1998 as he had in FY 1997 indi-
cates that he prefers much of the money to be spent on existing agency activities
rather than on addition recommendations made by the agencies or on his priori-
ties in other areas of government. This suggests that redirection may yield
diminishing returns over time, as agencies run out of low-priority items to
redirect.
Another difference between the first- and second-year redirections was that
the percentage of redirected funds that were shifted outside of agencies dropped
substantially. This also indicates that the governor felt that many of his highest
priorities were being satisfactorily funded in FY 1998, and therefore, it was
unnecessary to take as large a redirection away from the agencies’ existing
bases. This change could also signify that agencies were more successful at jus-
tifying their requests for addition in FY 1998. As a result, they were able to con-
vince the governor that the redirection money would be better spent within their
departments.
The numbers provided in Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate that redirection has
been successful at shifting funds from the budget base to different priorities,
whether they be within or outside of agencies. The total dollar amounts redi-
rected were modest. However, redirection was never designed with the intention
of implementing large reallocations. The creators of redirection recognized that
doing so would likely be politically difficult, if not impossible. They did,
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however, believe that obsolete, inefficient, and low-priority activities did exist at
the margins that could be eliminated.
Agency Perceptions Concerning the Base
The aggregate budget data analyzed above provides an incomplete picture of
redirection’s impact on the budget base. Three important questions remain
unanswered: (a) How did the legislature respond to the governor’s redirection
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TABLE 2: Governor’s Fiscal Year 1998 Redirection Recommendations as a Percentage of Fiscal
Year 1997 Budget Authority
Total Funds Redirected Redirected
Agency to Redirect Within Agency Out of Agency
Administrative Services 2.72 1.96 0.75
Agriculture 3.27 0.81 2.47
Banking and Finance 4.97 4.22 0.74
Children and Youth Services 4.82 4.78 0.04
Community Affairs 7.01 6.95 0.06
Corrections 2.99 2.57 0.42
Defense 5.09 2.73 2.36
Education 1.54 1.38 0.16
Forestry Commission 4.94 3.01 1.93
Georgia Bureau of Investigation 0.83 1.85 –1.01
Office of the Governor 2.91 0.37 2.54
Human Resources 5.57 2.36 3.20
Industry, Trade, and Tourism 4.02 2.88 1.14
Insurance Commissioner 5.04 1.42 3.62
Labor 0.13 0.00 0.13
Law 0.80 1.26 –0.46
Medical Assistance 2.82 2.67 0.15
Natural Resources 3.83 2.90 0.93
Public Safety 4.29 3.71 0.57
Public Service Commission 4.96 2.82 2.14
Student Finance Commission 0.85 0.85 0.00
Regents 5.05 4.69 0.36
Revenue 3.41 6.73 –3.32
Secretary of State 4.41 3.10 1.31
Soil and Water Conservation Commission 6.32 6.19 0.12
Teachers’ Retirement System 1.45 0.00 1.45
Technical and Adult Education 4.42 4.68 –0.27
Transportation 7.57 8.83 –1.26
Veterans Service 8.14 0.35 7.79
Workers Compensation Board 5.81 5.08 0.73
Average 4.00 3.04 0.96
Total (in million dollars) 349.0 296.7 52.3
Total dollars as percentage of fiscal year
1996 budget authority 3.1 2.6 0.5
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requests? (b) How much of what was redirected would have been done anyway?
and (c) Did redirection cause agencies to scrutinize their budget bases more than
they had in the past? To answer these questions, agency fiscal officers, OPB ana-
lysts, and the director of LBO were asked to give their perceptions in regard to
these key issues. Agency fiscal officers and OPB analysts were asked how the
legislature responded to the governor’s redirection recommendations. This
question was asked to determine if the legislature ignored the redirection recom-
mendations of the governor. If the legislature failed to approve the redirection
recommendations, then the redirection reform would not have resulted in reallo-
cations of funds from within the budget base.
Twenty seven (93.1%) of the agency fiscal officers and 17 (89.5%) of the
OPB analysts asserted that the legislature made only minor changes to the redi-
rection recommendations proposed by the governor. Two (6.9%) agency offi-
cials and 1 (5.3%) OPB analyst replied that the legislature made large changes to
the governor’s redirection recommendations. The director of LBO stated that
the legislature tended to support most of the governor’s redirection changes.
According to the interviewees, the general assembly altered redirection lev-
els to make them reflect legislative priorities. Some agencies suffered deeper
redirection cuts due to legislative actions. Others received increases or
decreases in the additions money recommended by the governor for them. Still
others were given some of their redirection money back to them.
The responses to this question indicate that the legislature made few changes
to the governor’s redirection recommendations for the state’s agencies. Changes
that were made were done in support of legislative priorities. This shows that
redirection allows the legislature the opportunity to make changes that are in the
political interests of its members.
Another question posed to agency and OPB personnel was, how much of
what was redirected by agencies would have been done anyway in the absence of
redirection? This question was asked to see if the money that was being shifted
due to redirection was actually changing what governmental units do. If it could
be found that the money being shifted around was not changing spending behav-
ior, then evidence would exist that demonstrated that redirection’s reallocations
were not in fact having an impact on the base budget.
Of the agency fiscal officers interviewed, 11 (37.9%) said that none of the
money they redirected would have been done in the absence of the redirection
reform. Another 7 (24.1%) claimed that very little—less than 20%—of what
they redirected would have been done in the absence of redirection. Nine
(31.0%) stated that 20% or more of what they redirected would have been done
anyway. Of these, 5 claimed that more than 50% would have been done anyway,
and 2 more asserted that almost all of it would have been done. Most of the fiscal
officers were quick to point out that the changes that they would have made any-
way were important modifications that needed to be carried out to help their
agencies achieve their missions. In addition, 5 of those responding that more
than 20% would have been done in the absence of the redirection reform stated
280 ARPA / September 1999
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016arp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
that redirection helped them to expedite the changes that they made. These fiscal
officers noted that without redirection, their proposed changes would have taken
a longer period of time to implement fully. One fiscal officer did complain that
redirection was, for the most part, a waste of time for his agency. He explained
that almost all of his agency’s funding is earmarked by law, and the nature of
what his agency does makes it difficult to shift money around to higher
priorities.
Much like the agency fiscal officers, most of the OPB analysts stated that very
little of the redirections that were made would have been done anyway. Twelve
(63.2%) claimed that less than 20% of agency redirections would have been
done in the absence of the reform. Of these analysts, 3 asserted that the agencies
with whom they worked would have done none of their redirections had the
reform not been implemented. Five (26.3%) OPB officials admitted that the
agencies they dealt with probably would have done 20% or more of what they
redirected. Of these, 2 said that their agencies would have done almost all of
what they redirected anyway. The responses to this question suggest that most of
what was redirected would not have been done had redirection not been imple-
mented. This means that the aggregate numbers presented in the previous sec-
tion represent real changes in the budget bases of agencies. However, a number
of agencies were able to hide some of what they would have done anyway in their
redirection requests. One reason for this is that some agencies, because of the
nature of their funding source and work, may not have been well suited to imple-
ment the redirection reform. In other cases, agencies used redirection to help
them accelerate changes that they felt needed to be made but likely would be
made at some time in the future. It has also been suggested that many of the
changes that would have been made anyway were legitimate requests intended
to improve agency operations. Therefore, it appears that agencies, for the most
part, offered up items they believed would result in an improved ability to carry
out their missions.
A final question, designed to find out if agencies were making a serious effort
to find items in their base that were no longer useful or necessary, asked inter-
viewees if redirection had encouraged agencies to subject their budget bases to
more scrutiny than they had in the past. Twenty-one (72.4%) of the agency fiscal
officers and 17 (89.5%) of the OPB analysts asserted that their agencies were
scrutinizing the budget base to a greater extent than they had during previous
years. Seven (24.1%) of the agency budget officers and 2 (10.5%) of the OPB
analysts stated that their agencies have not scrutinized the base more under redi-
rection than they had previously. However, 7 (6 agency and 1 OPB) of these
respondents claimed that their agencies had always scrutinized the base as much
as possible in the past. As a result, there was no reason to scrutinize it any further
under redirection. The responses to this question indicate that agencies are put-
ting forth a good faith effort to find items from within the budget base that are no
longer necessary, so that the resources devoted to them can be shifted to higher
priorities.
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The responses to the above questions indicate that redirection is having its
intended effect on the budget base. Funds are being reallocated from within the
budget base, with the approval of the legislature. Most of what was reallocated
would not have been done in the absence of the redirection reform. Finally, agen-
cies have been encouraged to analyze their budget bases to find items that do not
serve important priorities or are not effective.
Effects on Aggregate Agency Requests
Redirection appears to have had an impact on agency request behavior and
the ability of agencies to expand their budgets. Table 3, column 3 reveals that
between FY 1993 and FY 19965 the mean agency budget request was for 165.4%
of its previous FY budget authority. In other words, agencies requested an aver-
age increase of 65.4% for their budgets during these years. In contrast, the mean
agency budget request in FY 1997 was for 114.1% of its FY 1996 budget author-
ity, an average requested increase of 14.1%.6 t tests reveal that the difference
between the mean requests for FY 1996 and FY 1997 is significant at the .01
level, whereas there is no significant difference between the mean requests of
previous years. The difference between the mean request for the period FY 1993
to 1996 and FY 1997 is also significant at the .05 level. This indicates that redirec-
tion successfully prevented agencies from making relatively large requests for
FY 1997.
The mean agency request in FY 1998 was for 122.7% of its FY 1997 budget
authority, an increase of 8.6% above the FY 1997 mean request. This increase
was the result of agencies asking for larger expansions for capital improvements
than they requested the previous FY. This indicates that agencies may be
attempting to get around the restrictions on their ability to be acquisitive by ask-
ing for large increases for capital improvements (which are not restricted by any
cap). However, the mean request for FY 1998 remained significantly lower than
mean agency requests for the pre-redirection years, FY 1993 to FY 1996. In
addition, Table 3 reveals that the change between the FY 1997 and FY 1998
mean requests were not statistically significant, indicating that agency efforts to
request larger increases in their capital budgets did not significantly improve
their ability to behave acquisitively. As a result, it appears that redirection has
limited the ability of agencies to act in an acquisitive manner.
Another indication that the redirection procedures have limited the ability of
agencies to act in an acquisitive manner can be found in Table 3, column 4. Col-
umn 4 (GSTS—governor’s short-term support) shows the governor’s recom-
mendation as a percentage of the agency requests. This is a measure of the gover-
nor’s support for agency requests. The mean for FY 1993 to FY 1996 was 80.7,
signifying that on average, the governor recommended that agencies be funded
at a level equal to 80.7% of agency budget requests during those FYs. In com-
parison, for FY 1997, the governor recommended that agencies be funded at
88.4% of their request levels. The difference between the mean GSTS levels for
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FY 1996 and FY 1997 was significant at the .01 level, whereas there was no sig-
nificant difference between the mean GSTS levels of prior years. Table 3, also
reveals that the GSTS level for FY 1998 (87.1%) was not significantly different
from the FY 1997 level, signifying that the governor’s support of agency
requests remained high for both redirection years.
These findings indicate that the governor’s recommendations are closer to
agency requests under redirection. It is likely that they are closer because agency
requests have been restrained by redirection. Agencies’ acquisitiveness have
been restricted, thus agencies must limit their requests to their most important
activities and items. It is, therefore, possible for the governor to take the requests
more seriously.
Redirection appears to have had its most dramatic impact on the ability of
agencies to expand their budgets. Table 3, column 5 (GSE—governor’s support
for expansion) shows the governor’s recommendation as a percentage of the pre-
vious year’s budget authority. This is a measure of the willingness of the gover-
nor to increase agency appropriations above their previous year’s level. The
mean GSE for FY 1993 to FY 1996 is 107.84, signifying that the governor rec-
ommended that agency budgets be increased above their previous FY’s level, by
an average of 7.84%. In contrast, the governor recommended on average a
decrease of 1.08% for agencies for FY 1997 and 0.84% for FY 1998, despite the
fact that state revenues overall had increased by moderate amounts for both
years. The table reveals a significant difference at the .001 level between the
GSE means for FY 1996 and FY 1997, whereas there is no significant difference
between the mean GSE levels of previous FYs. Furthermore, there is no signifi-
cant difference between the means for FY 1997 and FY 1998. This is a clear indi-
cation that redirection has caused the governor to become less supportive of
agency budget expansion. This is shown further by Table 4.
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TABLE 3: Mean Percentage Change By Stages in the Budget Process of Major Agencies
Fiscal Year N Acqui GSTS GSE BE
1992 28 132.50 74.85 93.06 88.28
1993 30 163.41 81.75* 104.21*** 106.02***
1994 30 145.24 84.69 110.02 111.01
1995 30 200.47 77.60 108.44 111.58
1996 30 152.55 78.57 108.67 112.06
1997 30 114.09** 88.39** 98.92*** 101.87***
1998 30 122.72 87.07 99.16 98.79
1993-1996 average 165.42**** 80.65**** 107.84**** 110.17****
NOTE: Acqui = agency request as a percentage of previous year’s budget authority; GSTS = governor’s
recommendation as a percentage of agency request; GSE = governor’s recommendation as a percentage
of previous year’s budget authority; BE = legislative appropriation as a percentage of previous year’s
budget authority.
*Significantly different from the previous year at the 0.05 level. **Significantly different from the previ-
ous year at the 0.01 level. ***Significantly different from the previous year at the 0.001 level. ****Sig-
nificantly different from both 1997 and 1998 at the 0.05 level.
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Table 4 provides the percentage difference between the governor’s recom-
mendation and the previous year’s budget authority. It shows that under redirec-
tion, the governor has been more likely to recommend reductions in agency
funding. The governor recommended reductions in 19 agencies for FY 1997 and
16 agencies for FY 1998, whereas he recommended only 16 agency reductions
for all of the previous 4 years. This may indicate that the governor felt that the
priorities of many agencies were met adequately by redirection add-backs;
therefore, increasing agency budgets was unnecessary. Note also that for both of
the redirection years, the governor requested increases for the Department of
Education, the Board of Regents, and the Student Finance Commission, each of
which carry out programs considered to be the highest priorities of the governor.
This indicates that redirection helps the governor to meet his budget priorities.
Table 3, column 6 (BE—budget expansion) shows the legislative appropria-
tion as a percentage of the previous year’s budget authority. This is a measure of
the willingness of the legislature to increase agency appropriations above their
previous year’s level. The mean BE for FY 1993 to FY 1996 is 110.17, signify-
ing that the legislature appropriated increases for agencies above their previous
FY’s level, by an average of 10.17%. In comparison, the legislature appropriated
on average an increase of only 1.87% for agencies for FY 1997 and a decrease of
1.21% for FY 1998. Table 3 shows a significant difference at the .001 level
between the BE means for FY 1996 and FY 1997, whereas there is no significant
difference between the mean BE levels of previous FYs. In addition, no signifi-
cant difference exists between the mean BE levels for FYs 1997 and 1998. This
is an indication that redirection has led the legislature to be less willing to allow
agencies to acquire large increases in their budgets. Table 5 supports this
finding.
Table 5 provides the percentage difference between the legislative appropria-
tion and the previous year’s budget authority. It shows that the legislature was
willing to reduce 15 agency budgets for each of the redirection years, while it
was only willing to reduce agency budgets 13 times during the previous 4 years.
In addition, adding further evidence that redirection aids the governor in further-
ing his priorities, Table 5 reveals that the legislature granted increases to the
Department of Education, the Board of Regents, and the Student Finance Com-
mission, for both FY 1997 and FY 1998. These increases averaged 14.7% in FY
1997 and 7.2% in FY 1998, much higher than the mean percentage change for all
of the state’s agencies.
CONCLUSION
The results of this analysis show that the redirection reform appears to be
having an impact on budgeting in Georgia. Under redirection, modest amounts
of money from the budget base are being shifted to different priorities both
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within and outside of agencies, agencies have been limited in their ability to act
in an acquisitive manner and expand and maintain their budgets, both the gover-
nor and legislature have been less willing to expand agency budgets as a whole,
and the governor has been able to fund his highest priorities.
The amount of funds redirected from FY 1997 to FY 1998 did decline. This
decline could indicate that it is becoming difficult to continually find resources
to shift from within the budget base without cutting into priorities important to
the governor, legislature, and agencies. If this is so, then it is likely that
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TABLE 4: Percentage Difference Between the Governor’s Recommendation and the Previous
Year’s Budget Authority
Fiscal Year
Agency 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Administrative Services –20.69 6.33 5.27 –1.34 4.57 –0.99 –3.51
Agriculture –4.41 3.42 0.45 3.94 0.97 –1.28 8.35
Banking and Finance 3.32 3.20 5.57 2.03 3.29 –0.92 0.85
Children and Youth Services NA 0.63 6.30 3.92 39.46 5.06 19.43
Community Affairs –23.12 –0.65 31.60 18.97 –5.28 –26.72 –34.15
Corrections 7.41 11.22 7.11 9.63 5.12 –3.74 0.83
Defense –24.71 –20.33 2.91 12.36 1.05 –11.05 –0.55
Education 2.21 4.95 5.25 6.12 5.50 6.81 3.05
Forestry Commission –4.61 1.90 1.19 2.05 2.33 –3.83 –1.77
GBI –5.24 3.21 0.81 5.58 8.36 –2.26 0.42
Office of the Governor –3.78 8.38 3.97 1.32 10.30 –7.66 –5.10
Human Resources NA 2.96 3.53 5.47 6.08 –2.49 –2.64
Industry, Trade, and Tourism –10.32 5.22 10.81 13.43 43.08 –20.47 –5.14
Insurance Commissioner –6.29 29.42 –4.01 0.29 2.52 –4.46 2.01
Labor –6.12 2.85 –2.18 7.39 4.36 9.26 4.38
Law –5.05 8.34 4.55 5.09 10.66 0.30 1.06
Medical Assistance 1.46 –1.95 12.56 6.89 3.96 –3.13 0.59
Natural Resources –9.71 –3.49 6.81 17.30 10.47 2.17 –4.79
Public Safety –3.65 6.01 2.02 4.01 3.08 –2.82 –1.08
Public Service Commission –6.00 24.92 –1.19 –4.42 2.59 –3.36 –2.70
Student Finance Commission –0.57 17.31 161.84 89.79 32.60 30.95 8.62
Board of Regents –0.34 7.04 9.45 9.46 14.50 0.46 0.85
Revenue –5.20 5.29 –3.56 9.71 7.91 –5.88 0.11
Secretary of State 1.97 5.94 2.36 9.60 6.51 –2.17 –1.55
Soil and Water Conservation
Commission –9.10 –10.28 9.01 3.14 12.83 –0.91 0.60
Teachers’ Retirement System –59.18 –2.53 –1.30 3.29 3.82 1.35 –2.18
Technical and Adult Education –4.88 –0.04 14.42 0.38 17.48 7.34 –1.00
Transportation –0.84 –3.00 3.50 3.07 1.19 18.79 –0.11
Veterans Service –1.60 1.59 0.45 3.90 0.05 –11.37 –9.87
Workers Compensation Board 4.79 8.48 1.11 0.72 0.66 0.54 –0.19
Average –7.39 4.00 9.70 8.17 8.42 –1.08 –0.84
N 28 30 30 30 30 30 30
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redirection will yield diminishing returns over time, as agencies eliminate most
of their low priorities and are forced to offer up items important to the governor
and legislature. Naturally, this will result in fewer items being accepted for redi-
rection as time goes by. This, however, does not eliminate the use of forcing
agencies to identify 5% for redirection. Doing so alerts elected officials to the
lowest priorities of agencies and gives them information that can help them to
make tradeoffs between programs. It also encourages agencies to continually
reevaluate the things they are doing.
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TABLE 5: Percentage Difference Between the Legislative Appropriation and the Previous
Year’s Budget Authority
Fiscal Years
Agency 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Administrative Services –29.32 6.70 9.77 –2.72 14.33 2.21 –2.33
Agriculture –13.72 5.30 3.46 5.39 3.83 –7.73 –1.29
Banking and Finance 0.21 5.34 13.91 3.78 7.23 0.87 2.20
Children and Youth Services NA 9.06 7.11 5.97 41.37 8.37 22.41
Community Affairs –23.12 6.53 45.84 41.62 16.86 18.30 –30.84
Corrections –4.53 13.12 10.97 11.16 8.04 –0.72 4.01
Defense –29.62 –20.31 –6.79 14.13 14.84 –9.88 3.12
Education –0.92 8.46 6.11 9.80 9.95 11.24 7.66
Forestry Commission –12.46 0.28 2.52 3.83 4.73 –2.89 –2.55
GBI –10.30 3.76 1.66 10.43 12.08 0.58 3.42
Office of the Governor 10.15 7.45 8.82 6.00 13.38 –2.37 –4.34
Human Resources NA 4.08 5.63 7.38 8.37 –0.61 –0.71
Industry, Trade, and Tourism –15.69 3.38 4.37 15.54 33.96 –19.46 –3.67
Insurance Commissioner –13.40 20.62 –2.68 2.70 7.56 –3.50 3.91
Labor –8.54 2.10 –2.61 6.80 4.46 9.40 –46.50
Law –11.32 5.79 3.25 11.48 18.69 2.23 4.81
Medical Assistance 19.48 13.06 14.55 8.13 4.28 –2.75 0.96
Natural Resources –20.69 –3.10 11.25 20.30 13.55 5.71 –2.86
Public Safety –9.27 5.94 2.52 7.02 8.03 –0.05 –1.69
Public Service Commission –15.02 25.20 –0.64 –0.76 4.48 –3.09 –0.06
Student Finance Commission –6.41 14.43 141.53 86.80 32.65 28.22 8.69
Board of Regents –9.10 8.89 10.92 12.22 12.25 4.78 5.32
Revenue –13.87 18.54 –2.17 11.09 10.32 –3.87 0.70
Secretary of State –5.73 5.74 3.51 12.33 9.03 –0.21 1.11
Soil and Water Conservation
Commission –13.79 –1.50 9.86 4.13 13.31 –2.75 0.49
Teachers’ Retirement System –59.18 –2.53 –1.30 3.29 3.82 1.35 –1.45
Technical and Adult Education –11.64 3.71 14.93 18.09 23.27 13.09 –0.51
Transportation –15.84 –0.79 3.54 3.04 1.29 18.86 –0.07
Veterans Service –6.04 1.44 6.54 4.39 2.89 –11.40 –8.22
Workers Compensation Board 1.46 9.80 3.89 3.94 3.07 2.38 2.02
Average –12.01 5.75 10.66 11.21 12.90 1.87 –1.21
N 28 30 30 30 30 30 30
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It can be seen that budget change under redirection takes place on an incre-
mental level. Reallocations occur at the margins. What makes redirection different
from pure incrementalism is that it does not take all of the budget base as a given
each year and then add a fair-share increase to each agency. Under redirection,
parts of the base are systematically examined to determine if they continue to be
worthy of funding. This examination provides elected officials with the infor-
mation they need to make important tradeoffs between programs and priorities.
As a result, the major impact of redirection is not in the amount of money reallo-
cated but in the change in behavior from viewing everything in the base as a
given to examining the base in order to identify and possibly eliminate low pri-
orities and in reducing agency acquisitiveness.
Before ending, it should be noted that although the findings of this research
suggest that redirection is accomplishing its intended goals, it must be kept in
mind that the strong budgeting powers of the governor in Georgia may be an
important factor in its success. Therefore, attempts to implement redirection in
other jurisdictions, in which the chief executive is less powerful, may yield less
satisfactory results. Unfortunately, redirection had not been put into use in other
jurisdictions as of the time of this study. Future research should examine
redirection-like processes as they become adopted in other jurisdictions.
NOTES
1. The director’s title is Legislative Budget Analyst.
2. The Office of Planning and Budget (OPB) define the adjusted base as the previous fiscal year’s
(FY’s) “Annual Operating Budget (AOB), less non-recurring expenditures, plus annualizers for pay
raises and improvements” (OPB, 1996, p. 2). Only state funds are used to calculate the base; federal
funds are not included.
3. For example, if two units (Unit A and Unit B) of Agency X were sharing equally the mainte-
nance costs of a building in which they were both located, Agency X would not be permitted to give
Unit B a greater share of the office space in the building and then redirect a portion of Unit A’s main-
tenance costs to Unit B. This would be an invalid redirection because the maintenance costs for the
building are fixed and cannot be transferred to another agency unless the building is either closed
down or abandoned by Agency X. In addition, federal funds may not be redirected.
4. Note that the redirection for Veterans Services constituted 40.9% of its previous year’s budget
authority, significantly larger than would be expected. This is the result of the agency privatizing one
of its nursing homes. The operation of the nursing home absorbed a large portion of the agency’s
budget, and therefore, its privatization could not be fit into a 5% block. Note, however, that the
majority of the funds redirected was retained by Veterans Services. This money was needed to pay
the private firm now operating the nursing home. Note also that several agencies had more than 5%
redirected. This is largely the result of using the FY 1996 budget authority in the table rather than the
adjusted base employed by agencies to calculate their 5%. This makes the numbers appear inflated.
Some agencies, however, did redirect more than 5%.
5. FY 1992 is not included in the calculation of the mean because of the effects of the recession on
that year’s budget.
6. Note that this is higher than the 6.5% limit imposed by redirection. The higher number is the
result of there being no cap on requests for capital expenditures.
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